It sometimes happens in the history of ideas that two person both of whom are regarded by posterity as typical representatives o age, were during their own lifetimes unaware of any common grou perhaps even viewed each other with hostility because of certain di ences in outlook, which we would today regard as trifles or at matters of minor importance. In the seventeenth century we see a ple of this in Pierre Bayle's attitude towards Spinoza. Their co opposition to intolerance, superstition, and absolutism in state and did not prevent Bayle from speaking with horror and contempt of za's philosophy: "la plus monstrueuse hypothese que se puisse im la plus absurde et le plus diametralement opposee aux notions distinctes de l'esprit humain."1 Or take Lessing's attitude towards V in the Age of Enlightenment: the "German Voltaire," as Lessing is times called (not without justice), hated his French counterpart the latter failed to appreciate Shakespeare and clung instead to the tional rules of classicist theater. A similar case is offered in the first half of the nineteenth century by Arthur Schopenhauer's bitter invectives against the "charlatan" and "frecher Unsinnschmierer" Hegel, who, on his side, consistently ignored his somewhat younger contemporary. It is now generally admitted that, at least with the two other main representatives of German Idealism, Fichte and Schelling, Schopenhauer had more in common than he would himself have been ready to admit. And though it is certainly true that his differences with Hegel were of a more profound nature,2 both passionately took sides with Goethe in the latter's notorious polemic against Newton's Opticks.
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One might argue that we have to do here with a mere coincidence because the theory of color was only a relatively unimportant issue in the work of both thinke symptomatic importance o here than only a controve All the differences that exist between Goethe's scientific outlook and the romantic German Naturphilosophie of his time, important as they are,3 cannot conceal their common root in the rejection of the mechanicist view of nature and in the ardent desire to replace it with a conception of Nature as a dynamic Whole, dominated by the twin principles of Polaritat and Steigerung. The former means that Nature works through antagonisms that are not mutually exclusive but rather supplementary and possessing an underlying unity. The latter means that Nature is possessed by an inner tendency towards ever higher and more complex forms. The most typical representative of Naturphilosophie was Schelling (at least at one stage of his Protean philosophical development), and it is therefore interesting to compare Hegel's and Schopenhauer's reception of Schelling's doctrines and to take this as a starting-point for an attempt to point at some similarities in their philosophical positions-similarities which tend to be overlooked by their respective admirers but which might help to explain how these apparent antipodes could both take sides with Goethe against Newton. When we examine in some detail their respective contributions to the theory of color, however, we shall see the profound differences in the way they defended an apparently common cause. The concluding section of this paper is devoted to a critical comparison between their respective philosophical attitudes insofar as these may help to explain such differences.
Hegel and Schopenhauer on Schellingianism
It will not surprise anybody that Schopenhauer rejected Schelling's philosophy at all its stages, since he rejected German Idealism as a whole.
Schopenhauer's main objection to German Idealism was that it had betrayed Kant's critical heritage by confusing what Kant had neatly separated ("phenomenon" and "thing-in-itself," the "ideal" and the "real," etc.) in order to gain knowledge about the "Absolute," thus deliberately sanctioning deep-seated religious and popular prejudices. Therefore, he rejected Schelling's "philosophy of identity" (in which the earlier "philosophy of nature" may be said to have reached its logical conclusion) no less than his later so-called "positive philosophy" (not to be confused with its Comtean namesake), with its teleological interpretation of history as a kind of theogony. Nevertheless, despite his denial, Schopenhauer probably was influenced by Schelling to some extent. On the other hand, the notion of the Absolute in the form Schelling had given it was criticized by Hegel as well. Although Schelling is not explicitly mentioned in the famo "Preface" to Hegel's first major work, the Phenomenology of Spirit, it is clear that the Identitatsphilosophie of his former friend, fellow student, and in a sense predecessor,4 is the target of the ironical remark about th "night in which all cows are black."5
In this Preface Hegel is constantly fighting on two fronts: agains "empty broadness" and against "empty profundity." Whereas the former (its typical representative being the Enlightenment) only gathers materia without ordering it, the latter (represented by Romanticism) wants look immediately into the depths of the Absolute but, in doing so, produce only "artefacts that are neither fish nor fowl, neither poetry nor philos phy."6 Philosophy should be "scientific" and articulate and therefor ought not to content itself with subjective intuition and vague feelin Hegel therefore criticizes Schelling's beloved "intellectual intuition" ju as Kant had already done in anticipation7 and as Schopenhauer did repeatedly. Schopenhauer mocks the "sixth sense of the bats," which he do not claim to possess8 and ironically confesses that he belongs to thos "profanes" who completely lack "Vernunft-Anschauung" and must therefore refrain from giving their readers the latest pieces of news about th Absolute.9 Hegel, on the other hand, agrees with the prophets of "Ve nunft-Anschauung" as far as the essential unity of Being and Thinking is concerned; but for him "it is essential to know whether this intellectual intuition does not relapse into inert simplicity and does not picture reali itself in an unreal way."10 The difference should be clear: a holistic visio is for Hegel possible in principle (while for Schopenhauer it is not), but i should be reached in a "scientific" way and not through unreflected "intuition." Thus both reject Schelling's more thorough-going and roman tic holism; indeed neither Hegel nor Schopenhauer (for different reasons was a romantic Nature-worshipper. For this reason it may be expecte that both thinkers had a more positive appreciation of science than w displayed by romantic Naturphilosophie. This is indeed true insofar the empirical aspect of science is concerned. Both were reasonably we acquainted with the science of their time and both accorded it a legitimate if restricted, role. As we shall see in the next section, both the legitimac 4 Though Hegel was five years older than Schelling, the latter's amazing philosophic precocity seems to justify this qualification; and it is certainly in agreement with Schellin own opinion. mediately, as mere epigones of Aristotle, invoked forma substantialis and qualitates occultae providing, instead of explanations, nothing but barbarous Latinisms (a tree is a tree by its arboreitas, bread is bread by it paneitas, etc.). Cartesianism lapsed from one extreme into the other b wishing to explain all natural phenomena by the laws of mechanics According to Cartesian dualism no original properties existed in the o jects at all but all were derived from those properties that belong to the objects as such, i.e., hardness, impenetrability, and the passing-on motion. 16
Here we have in a nutshell all elements that from then on were to characterize Schopenhauer's attitude towards science. He distrusted its rationalism, which had not only methodological but also ontological pretensions and which provides nothing but a poor, oversimplified worldview in which everything is reduced to mechanics. Yet Schopenhauer also had respect for the empirical aspect of science, which for him should be supplemented by a metaphysics of Nature better and richer than what is offered as such by mechanicist philosophy. It is not basically different with Hegel. Already in the Phenomenology of Spirit and later in the third part of the Encyclopedia he presents us with his view of the development of human knowledge. Knowledge begins with "sense-certainty," which is the state of mind at which we enjoy direct acquaintance with the object, and proceeds by interpreting the flux of sense-impressions as permanent properties of a thing: this is the level of "perceptual consciousness." But the thing can express and reveal what it is only in the way in which it behaves towards other things, and with this insight we have reached the level of "scientific understanding": the realm of things is now transformed into a realm of forces. Now forces are unobservable entities that become manifest only in the way in which they work, and so the realm of forces is essentially a realm of laws, which connect various types of phenomena and explain their changes. The essence of the force is nothing more than the content of the law. All explanation of empirical science can therefore never be more than the transformation of sense-appearance into the ideal form of laws: "the stable image of unstable appearances," "the quiet model of the perceived world," the "tranquil Kingdom of Laws."17 Empirical science provides us only with an orderly description of the phenomena we wish to explain; therefore, the level of understanding (Verstand) should be transcended in its turn. It is only when, by way of self-consciousness, we have reached the level of Reason (Vernunft), that absolute knowledge becomes possible.
Schopenhauer certainly did not believe in the possibility of "absolute knowledge"; but he did believe that "metaphysics of nature" can at least 
Hegel, Schopenhauer, and the Hierarchy of Sciences
Given the crucial role of mathematics in modern science, it is interest ing to examine Hegel's and Schopenhauer's appreciation of this intellec tual activity. Here again we see a remarkable resemblance. Hegel, in th "Preface," accuses mathematical knowledge of being arbitrary, since cannot give reasons for why the proof is given in such-and-such a wa and not otherwise. Besides, the subject-matter of mathematics is poor since it is wholly homogeneous and uniform and leaves no room for diversity. Therefore, mathematical knowledge is purely formal, and as fa as arithmetic is concerned, it is tautological (he does not use this expression, but it seems a not too arbitrary paraphrase of Hegel's interpretation of arithmetic as having merely to do with "the one").19 Schopenhauer, in his turn, criticizes the mathematical method of demonstrating immed ately evident things in a formally logical way and of comically surren dering when this is not possible (referring here to the dispute about the theory of parallels and the repeated attempts to prove Euclid's elevent axiom20). Not that either Hegel or Schopenhauer saw no place for mathematics in science. Of course they did; but they would insist that its usefulness is greatest in those fields which are almost purely formal, that is which are poor in empirical content. Or to put it in Schopenhauer's word "Applied mathematics, i.e., mechanics, hydraulics etc., has to do with the lowest levels of the objectivation of Will, where most still belongs to the realm of pure Representation, but where there is nevertheless already an empirical element which obscures the complete intelligibility and transparency [of pure mathematics] and with which something inexplicable is introduced. For the same reason only a few parts of physics and chemistr still lend themselves to mathematical treatment; higher up in the chain o being this ceases precisely because the content of the phenomenon he outweighs the form."21
Here we are at the heart of the matter. What Schopenhauer suggests here is the conception of a hierarchy of sciences, based upon the richness of their subject-matter and corresponding to a similar hierarchy in natur according to the different levels of "objectivation of Will," i.e., upon the different levels of complexity of natural phenomena. In the second volum of The World as Will and Representation this suggestion is elaborated int a schema that calls to mi According to this schema via the sciences of dead nat sciences of living nature ( What is striking in this Kuhn's distinction22) the scale than the "Baconian" pected, given both Hegel's ics, which they, too, accor
It is a commonplace that sciences was their growin in mathematical language involved. It is precisely aga and against the separation in its wake that Naturphilo tried to show, this protest stress that was laid by ph value of the empiricist, "B the rapid mathematizatio their very lifetime, this attitude towards the scient common rejection of Newt hauer rejected only the Ne of the Principia. True, he t already before Newton the Robert Hooke, and he attr in England to people's bein (typical once more for hi ences).24 Yet he readily ack in this domain. For wher relation between the distan its orbit, Newton demonstrated that and why it had to go in this manne "namely, because with this given distance to the central body the planet must have exactly this particular velocity in order not to fall into the su or to run away from it."25 With Hegel it is otherwise. To him, all that is sound in Newton comes from Kepler, the only difference between the two men being that "what Kepler expressed in a simple and sublime manner as constituting the laws of celestial motion, is changed by Newton into the reflective form of th force of gravity."26 By neglecting the fundamental distinction betwee mathematical analysis and physical reality Newton saddled physical m chanics with a "monstrous metaphysics, which, contrary to both experience and the Notion [Begriff] , has its sole source in these mathematic demonstrations."27 In all fairness to Hegel it should be acknowledged that popular Newtonianism in his times tended indeed to attribute metaphysical status to the forces treated in the Principia, but Hegel could have known that Newton himself was much more cautious in this respect. Though Newton certainly considered his "forces" as really existing and not only as a means of measurement, he did not "frame hypotheses" about the ultimate reality behind them.28 For Schopenhauer this was apparently modest enough, but not so for Hegel. One wonders whether he would have liked to return to the Ptolemaic situation of a complete separation between mathematical astronomy and physical astronomy. His predilection for ideas that were already hopelessly antiquated in his own day might make us believe so. (He also reproached Newton for having confused the "absolutely free movement" of the heavenly bodies with the "relatively free movement" of falling objects on earth,29 and he stuck firmly to the four traditional elements.) However, if this were the whole truth, he should have rejected Kepler as well. Perhaps a key is to be found in his remark, that "the Germans have often looked on impassively while the English have as- 27 Ibid. Cf. also Frans H. van Lunteren, "Hegel and Gravitation," Hegels Philosophie der Natur, ed. Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Michael John Petry (Stuttgart, 1986), 45-53. 28 On a relevant question of Bentley, Newton answered that, although he could calculate and describe it mathematically, he could not make statements about the physical reality behind these calculations (quoted by M. J. Petry in Hegel und die Naturwissenschaften, ed. Michael John Petry [Stuttgart, 1987] Sciences: A Reappraisal (Dordr through a turbid medium from a light-source behind it gives the sensat of yellow. In the first case there is darkness behind the medium, and th only light comes from a source in front or to one side of it; therefore, t light is not transmitted through the medium, but reflected from it.
From these two "polar opposites" all other colors can be derived through mixture or intensification (Steigerung). Since any color is eo ip darker than white, its intensification must of necessity yield a still dar one. Thus intensified yellow (the brightest of colors) grades into the dark red, and intensified blue into the darkest of all colors, i.e., violet. Si the latter contains an element of redness, too, it may be said that b polar opposites intensify to a more or less reddish tint. Green, on t contrary, results from a mixture of the two primary colors. Finally mixture of their intensified forms produces "purple," which Goethe als refers to as the "true red," since it is produced by both lines of intensifi tion together. What is normally called red (the red component of t spectrum) is, to Goethe, still a somewhat yellowish red. His "purple not exactly what is usually called "purple" either, but rather what would nowadays call "magenta." When, in his "color circle," Goeth places "red" and green in a polar position, then, he is fairly in agreemen with contemporary opinion. Goethe regarded the mixed nature of green as another argument against Newton because he did not realize that mix pigments (chemische Farben) and to mix spectral colors (physisc Farben) involves two fundamentally different processes. However, in ju tice to Goethe it should be mentioned that the difference between what we now call additive and subtractive color mixing, respectively, was not properly understood before Helmholtz's epochal investigations in the midnineteenth century.
Goethe severely criticized Newton's mode of experimentation. Newton, so he complained, subjected the phenomenon to completely artificial conditions in order to prove a preconceived theory. In the experimentum crucis Nature is truly crucified,32 or (to use another image) Nature is put on the rack to compel her to confess what the investigator had already beforehand decided upon. "But Nature is a steadfast and noble person, who stands by the truth, even under all pains. If it is otherwise stated in the protocol, then the inquisitor has misheard or the clerk has miswritten."33 Newton's belief that an achromatic telescope was impossible was regarded by Goethe as a typical example of his prejudiced mind, and the actual construction of such a telescope by Hall and later by Dollond served him as a striking proof of the invalidity of Newton's entire theory. Goethe was aware of the argument that Newton had indeed been wrong in his assumption that all refracting materials disperse the prismatic colors in a constant proportion and that this does not refute the core of his theory, However, Goethe's anger did not last long. Obviously, Hegel's publi championship of Goethe's theory of color in his Encyclopedia (the fir version of which dates from 1817), combined with the former's growing fame, contributed to the resumption of their broken contact, resulting i a friendly correspondence over the years 1817-2938 and culminating in a visit of Hegel to Weimar in the fall of 1827. Eckermann recorded the visit He informs us that Goethe had a high esteem for Hegel personally bu did not greatly appreciate some of the fruits of his philosophy, meaning by this his dialectics. Goethe feared that it might be abused for the purpo of turning falsehood into truth and truth into falsehood. Hegel answered in a reply meant to be reassuring, that this sometimes happens, but only with spiritually sick people.39 History does not record whether Hege perhaps defended his favorite philosophical child by pointing to the affin ity of his dialectics with Goethe's (and Schelling's) favorite Polaritat, but it does appear from his defense of Goethe's theory of color that he indee approved of this concept.
If we now pass on to an examination of how Hegel defended Goethe we must certainly award him the merit (if a merit it is) of having tried to integrate Goethe's theory of color into a larger philosophical framework.
In doing so he made some of its features more relative and elaborate some others. The manner in which he contrived to do this may be summed up in three points:
First, nature itself is not, for Hegel, the ultimate reality it was for th pantheist Goethe. We have already mentioned in passing that Hegel w not a romantic nature-worshipper. To him-in a rather Gnostic way the creation of Nature was a kind of Fall, not the fall of man Genesi speaks of but a Fall of God Himself. A necessary Fall, no doubt: Hegel dialectical method guarantees that everything has its place as a necessary stage in the system, and is as such justified, but nevertheless.... Th absolute idea decided "to externalize itself freely as Nature" (sich al Naturfrei aus sich zu entlassen); and the reason is that, being essentially one and being turned inward, it needs as its antithesis that which i then it would contract into one point).44 Whereas gravity thus reveals th unity of nature in a vague, obscure form, light does so in an ideal form, because it does not seek the unity but manifests it by its universal, uncorpo real nature. This is already sufficient reason to distrust the corpuscul theory of light and in fact the wave theory as well, since it supposes quasi-material medium, however "ethereal" it may be (it should be noted that Goethe, too, considered the wave theory as just as mechanical an materialistic as Newton's corpuscular theory, and for the same reason because its postulated "motion" still requires "something that moves" Third, color certainly arises for Hegel from an interaction of light an darkness, as Goethe had taught. Although, in principle gravity is ove come by light, in reality the lower, mechanical level of nature continues to exist. Thus, there is an antithesis between light and dark, heavy matter that hinders light's expansion and propagation. Once more this antithesis is a necessary one, since it is only through it that light becomes visible i the first place. "White is the corporal fixation of brightness, and is as ye achromatic; black is the materialization and specification of darkness colour occurs between these two extremes. It is the combination of light and darkness, and particularly the specification of this combination, which first gives rise to colour."45 Hegel tries, however, to give a more elaborat explanation of this interaction, in particular of the role of the "turb medium." Of central importance here is the phenomenon of transparency in connection with the nature of the four elements. Of these, only earth is opaque because of its abstract, material individuality, whereas air, water and fire are transparent because of their elementary generality and neutra ity. On the other hand, pure shape is transparent again, since it ha attained once more that neutrality and uniformity which is related to th ideal nature of light.
That is why crystals are transparent; but whereas the transparency of the elements mentioned has to do with their lack of inner cohesion, the transparency of a crystal comes from the homogeneity of its cohere shape.46 However, the different transparent media of light have all their particular nature, which expresses itself above all in their specific gravit From this follows their greater or lesser density, which, in the case water and air, is responsible for the phenomenon of refraction.47 In the case of crystals, this externally conditioned phenomenon gives place t an internally conditioned one. On the one hand crystals have a gener transparency, but on the other hand they possess in their inner individual ization or nuclear shape a form which deviates from the formal equality to which this general transparency belongs. It is this internal figuration   44HPN , II, 19. 45Ibid., 142. 46Ibid., 12. 47Ibid., 125. of crystals which gives ris brittle glass, although it is ization progresses from me which constitutes the begin nature of the crystal is no being this potential darkn licism therefore underlies apart from these "corporea ing (Goethe's "objective" which are produced by ex of a translucent but turb subjective" physical color The prism is the best kn effect. is with light that we put aside the contemplation of separateness and plurality and have to raise ourselves to the abstraction of existent identity,"53 then this whole new development in the science of optics was indeed irrelevant; for these men of course agreed with Newton about the compositeness of white light. But are we not then entitled to ask, when reading Hegel's complaint in the Introduction to his Philosophy of Nature about the "extravagances" of Schelling's philosophy,54 whether the pot does not here call the kettle black?
The principal weakness of Hegel's enterprise lies in his attempt to defend Goethe's theory of color as a physical theory. This was certainly in line with Goethe's own conviction; and it is therefore not surprising that Goethe, in spite of his occasional fits of concern over the strictly philosophical aspects of Hegelianism, was rather content with his orthodox disciple. It was somewhat otherwise with that other disciple of his, to whom we turn now.
Goethe and Schopenhauer
It would be interesting to know whether Hegel and Schopenhauer ever acquainted themselves with each other's work on the theory of color. The only thing that can be said for certain is that Hegel must have known of Schopenhauer's contact with Goethe in the period of, roughly, 1813-16, and of the existence of Schopenhauer's little book On Vision and Color (Ueber das Sehn und die Farben) written in 1816, since Schopenhauer mentions both in the curriculum vitae he presented in 1819 to the University in Berlin in order to obtain the venia legendi. But while Hegel read the curriculum vitae, he probably never read On Vision and Color; nor is it likely that Schopenhauer ever made a serious study of his rival's contribution to this area of science. In any case this would only have served to lay bare to them their fundamental difference. For Schopenhauer's metaphysics (which he had not yet developed at that time) does not play 52Ibid., 141. passive; it is the reaction to a received stimulus. In the case of the eye th stimulus is light; the reaction is an activity of the retina. If the latte receives the full effect of light, it develops a full activity; if light is absen i.e., if darkness reigns, the retina remains passive. Bodies which, und the influence of light upon them, act in their turn upon the eye with th same strength as light itself would do, are called "shining" or "mirrors" if they do so in concentrated form, and "white" if they do so in diffuse form. Bodies which, under the influence of light upon them, do not their turn act upon the eye, are called "black." Therefore, white ha essentially the same effect upon the eye as light; and this is why under th influence of either light or white the retina is fully active, whereas in the absence of both, i.e., in the case of either darkness or black, the retina is passive. Now the influence of light and of white on the retina and it resulting activity can occur in different degrees. Between the extremes o full activity and full passivity lie the domains of dimmed light (Halbschatten) and of grey, respectively. We may speak in this case of a quantitative divided activity of the retina, which can itself be differentiated into inten sively and extensively divided activity. The latter appears when the differ ent parts of the surface of the retina are active to a different degree. Thi explains a phenomenon described by Goethe in the first section of t didactical part of his Farbenlehre (Physiologische Farben), namely, that a black cross on a white ground, after having been gazed at for a certa time, produces the opposite phenomenon, i.e., a white cross on a blac ground, if we turn our eyes away from it and look on a grey or dim surface. Those spots on the retina that were affected by the white groun are now so exhausted by this stimulus that they cannot immediately activated by the much weaker stimulus of the grey surface. This, in i turn, now acts with its full vigor upon the other parts of the retina tha were previously affected by the black cross and consequently were at res and thus provokes the full activity of the retina.
But there is still a third possibility-qualitatively divided activity o the retina, the point at which color proper comes in. If you look intently at a white circle on a black ground for twenty to thirty seconds and the turn your eyes away to a light grey or dim surface, you will see a black cross on white ground for the reason given in the above. But if you put yellow circle in place of the white one and then look at the grey surface you will not see there a black circle but a violet one. Likewise an oran circle will produce a blue spectrum58; and a red circle ("red" in the Goethean sense, i.e., magenta) will produce a green spectrum and so o until the circle is closed. Schopenhauer's explanation of the phenomenon is as follows: yellow, being the brightest color, is somewhat darker than white; violet, being the darkest color, is somewhat brighter than blac such that violet is as muc white. Since all colors are to a differen than white, they all contain bot conception of color as a synthes the only difference is that the physiological, and to that exten And yet, Schopenhauer reluct Newton had been right. First, t even though this has to be soug also follows from Schopenhauer 59 SSW, I, 38. Schopenhauer here dif yellow and blue but yellow and viole thickness of the turbid medium then and finally into red (= magenta) and g white light can be produced out of a number of colored lights, only this number is two, not seven. For if, as Schopenhauer's theory asserts, tw opposite colors are complementary in regard to the full activity of t retina to whose division they owe their existence, then there can be n doubt that the union of two such colors will produce that full activity an consequently the impression of pure light or of white. And indeed if we gaze at red and immediately thereupon at green, no spectrum will appear It would, however, be more convincing if this could also be demon strated for physical colors. To that end it would be necessary that the tw external causes of the two complementary colors could be made to ac simultaneously and yet separately on the same spot of the retina. Now this may be done with prismatic colors. If one lays the violet band of on prismatic spectrum over the red (i.e., prismatic red) band of a second one the result will be "true" red (i.e., magenta); if one now directs the green band of a third prismatic spectrum toward that spot, that will appear as white. Goethe himself had made this experiment, but his polemic against Newton prevented him from accepting this result as conclusive evidence for the possibility of producing white light out of colored lights. Goethe argument had been that in this case the threefold sunlight is powerf enough to make the element of darkness invisible, although it remain present. Yet this argument does not convince Schopenhauer, because every color contains an element of darkness, as Goethe himself had taught then in his experiment not only the element of light but the elemen of darkness, too, must be threefold; and so they neutralize each othe Therefore, it is not the increased illumination but rather the opposition of the colors which produces here the impression of pure light, or of whit It is this passage in particular which provoked Goethe's anger and mad him regard his former disciple as an adversary.6 Wrongly, so Schopen hauer assures us, for this experiment does not at all demonstrate tha white, which is not true, or (still more absurd) in the proportion of a infinitely small fraction to one, and thus disappear in its own darkness. could be objected that Newton in fact did not say that colors exist in whit light outside the eye. More interesting therefore is Schopenhauer's other argument, namely, that it would presuppose a very remarkable and strang harmonia praestabilita if the relationship between colors as it arises in th eye in accordance with the laws of the latter's functioning would have an exact objective counterpart outside the eye.63 But even accepting Schopen hauer's arguments against Newton's theory would not prove the validity of Goethe's theory; and indeed, in the Latin version of On Vision and Color which dates from 1830, Schopenhauer explicitly admits that hi own theory is independent of Goethe's in so far as it would as a physiologi cal theory still be true even if Newton and Goethe as physicists both had been wrong.64
It was Werner Heisenberg who once, when speaking of the Goethe Newton controversy, suggested the gentleman's solution that, since th two theories deal with two completely different levels of reality, the might complement rather than contradict each other: Newton's theor would stand for the "objective" and Goethe's for the "subjective" aspe of the matter. From the foregoing it might perhaps be concluded tha Schopenhauer's modification of Goethe's theory would serve this en on the odd harmonia praestabilita such a combination would imply, make this quite clear. Should our conclusion then be that both thinkers failed, albeit for different reasons, and thus demonstrated, each in his own way the futility of all attempts towards a philosophy of nature?
Such a conclusion would be as historically unjust as it would b premature. It is easy for us to say that thinkers like Hegel and Schopenhauer fought a rear-guard battle in the wake of Goethe and Romanticism when they tried to put mathematical science into its proper place b insisting that only simple mechanical phenomena lend themselves t mathematical treatment. Certainly the mathematization of science h made triumphant progress since, but that does not mean that the romanti protest against the (often unconscious) metaphysics of the science of the time (the quantitative world of "primary qualities" as the true wor behind the deceptive qualitative world of human sense and feeling) w without justification, nor that the mathematical language of science provides the only legitimate tool for the eternal quest of the human mind o "was die Welt im Innersten zusammenhalt."
Moreover, I think that we should differentiate here once more between our two thinkers. Neither of them was a romantic Nature-worshippe both accorded to ("positivistically" understood) science a legitimate ro but thought that it should be augmented by a metaphysical "superstructure," and both insisted on the existence of varying levels of complexity as regards the subject-matter of the various sciences and therefore on hierarchy between them. Their fundamental difference was expressed in the most striking way by Schopenhauer himself. The Biblical myth creation shares one fundamental illusion with Hegel's interesting stor about an Idea that decides "to externalize itself freely as Nature." Th illusion is, according to Hegel, that the whole of things has its origi in an intellect, in other words, existed already as mere representatio (Vorstellung) before becoming real; and that, because of its origin i knowledge, it is consequently also wholly accessible to and understandabl and exhaustible by knowledge (if not by the trivial knowledge of Verstand then at least by the higher knowledge of Vernunft).69 It is indeed more than a mere question of words when Hegel turns the "Idea" and Schopenhauer the "World as Will" into the central tenet of his metaphysic For both logic stands methodologically at the beginning because of th elementarity and abstractness of its subject-matter; but for Schopenhaue its role is played out with that, whereas Hegel claims a quasi-ontologic status for his new, "dialectical" brand of logic. For Hegel logic is "th presentation of God as He was in His eternal essence before the creati of Nature and finite Spirit,"70 and therefore logic forms the alpha and th omega of his essentially circular system.
